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  3 1 Introduction 
In a dramatic reversal of the outcome at Seattle, 142 World Trade Organization (WTO) 
members went on to launch a new round of trade negotiations at the fourth WTO Ministerial 
held in Doha during November 9-14, 2001.  Two factors accounted for this reversal. 
First, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center left the United States 
more determined than ever to launch the new round.  The United States wanted to send a 
clear message that such attacks could not undermine its resolve to achieve progressively 
open world markets.  The U.S. determination translated into a greater willingness to grant 
concessions than at Seattle.  Other WTO members shared the U.S. goal and reciprocated by 
being more flexible than they were at Seattle.   
Second, the switchover from a Democratic to Republican administration made it 
possible for the United States to drop its insistence on placing labor standards on the WTO 
agenda.  This took what was perhaps potentially the most contentious issue off the table in 
Doha.  Since a large majority of developing countries was opposed to the inclusion of labor 
standards into the agenda in any form and was firmly united in its stance on this particular 
issue, the launch of the round would have been nearly impossible without this switchover. 
In this paper, I examine the achievements of the Doha Ministerial Conference from the 
viewpoint of developing countries.  My emphasis is on understanding the politics of the 
negotiations with a view to assessing the influence developing countries had on the 
outcome.  But in doing so, I also offer a political-economy analysis of the Uruguay Round 
(UR) Agreement and its relationship to the Doha outcome. 
The main conclusions of the paper may be summarized as follows.  First, with trade 
liberalization as its central focus, the Doha negotiating agenda is to be welcomed from the viewpoint of developing countries.  Second, the opposition by developing countries to the 
inclusion of at least some of the Singapore issues at Doha is defensible.
1  Among other 
things, the countries need more time before they can satisfactorily negotiate and undertake 
new obligations in these areas.  Third, while the UR Agreement benefited both developing 
and developed countries, on balance, it benefited the latter more.  The Doha outcome offers 
a better balance when taken by itself but does not go so far as to significantly correct the 
imbalance in the UR Agreement.  Fourth, despite this better balance, the Doha negotiations 
offer little evidence of a shift in the relative bargaining powers of developing and developed 
countries.  Nor do they suggest any softening of the tough negotiating stance developed 
countries took during the UR Round.  Fifth, much of the negotiating power continues to 
reside with developed countries.  Due to the absence of conflict on issues that divide along 
North-South lines and the presence of a few large players among them, developed countries 
are able to exercise this power more effectively than developing countries.  Finally, 
developing countries continue to suffer from poor research capacity and a lack of strategic 
thinking.  This is an area requiring serious attention if they are to wield their limited 
bargaining power more effectively.   
The paper is divided into six sections.  In Section 2, I offer a detailed description of the 
relevant documents produced at Doha emphasizing the items of critical interest to 
developing countries.  In Section 3, I discuss why developing countries have a legitimate 
case against the inclusion of some of the Singapore issue into the negotiating agenda.  In 
                                                 
1 The term “Singapore issues” refers to four issues first introduced into the WTO work program in 
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration: foreign investment, competition policy, trade 
facilitation, and transparency in government procurement.  At Doha, EU insisted upon the inclusion 
of these issues into the negotiating agenda while many developing countries opposed it. 
 
  2 Section 4, I discuss the legacy of the UR Agreement and its relationship to the Doha 
outcome.  In Section 5, I discuss the asymmetries that continue to exist between developed 
and developing countries and their implications for the Doha outcome.  Finally, in Section 6, 
I summarize the main conclusions and offer suggestions for what developing countries 
could do to shift future outcomes in their favor at least marginally.  Included here are some 
remarks on the importance of China to future negotiations. 
2  The Doha Documents 
The WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha produced three key documents:   
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Decision on Implementation-
Related Issues and Concerns, and Doha Ministerial Declaration.
2 
 Consider each of these 
documents in turn.
 
2.1  Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
According to most analysts, the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health represents some weakening of the TRIPS Agreement in so far as access to medicines 
is concerned.  Article 39 of the original TRIPS Agreement allows member governments to 
authorize third parties to produce a patented product through the so-called “compulsory 
licenses” to satisfy local needs.  It requires, however, that this authorization be preceded by 
                                                 
2 The acronym TRIPS stands for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.  The Doha 
Conference also produced two waivers, a GATT Article XIII waiver for the EC banana regime and a 
GATT Article I waiver for the ACP-EC Partnership (Cotonou) Agreement.  These waivers have no 
direct link to the Ministerial Declaration and could have been handled within the normal WTO 
procedures.  But they had to be moved forward to Doha to get support of the ACP countries for the 
round. A final document on which agreement had been reached in Doha but was not issued until 
November 20, 2001 deals with procedures for extension of Article 27.4 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures Agreement for certain developing member countries.  This document is 
also without direct bearing on the Ministerial Declaration. 
  3 efforts by the third party to obtain authorization from the patent holder on reasonable 
commercial terms.  The requirement can be waived “in the case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency.” 
  The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health weakens the conditions 
under which member governments can issue compulsory licenses.  It recognizes each 
member’s “right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds 
upon which such licenses are granted.”  It adds that each member “has the right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being 
understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency.”  By giving members the right to decide what constitutes a “national 
emergency” or “extreme urgency,” the Declaration seems to give them extra leeway in 
issuing compulsory licenses without prior effort by the potential licensee to obtain 
authorization at reasonable commercial terms.  How far this provision can be pushed will 
not be clear, however, until its boundaries are tested in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  
  It is important to note that there is an asymmetry in the way different members can 
benefit from the increased flexibility with respect to compulsory licensing.  Article 39 of the 
TRIPS Agreement allows the authorization of production by third parties “predominantly 
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”  Therefore, 
members that do not have domestic capability for such production will effectively be 
unable to benefit from the flexibility.  The Declaration has instructed the Council for 
TRIPS  “to find an expeditious solution to this problem and report to the General Council 
before the end of 2002.”   
  4   The Declaration gives the least developed countries an extra 10 years to implement 
the TRIPS Agreement in so far as pharmaceutical products are concerned.  This moves the 
date of implementation of patents for medicines from January 1, 2006 to January 1, 2016 of 
these countries. 
2.2  Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns  
Starting soon after the beginning of the implementation of the UR Agreement, 
developing countries had complained about a number of items that eventually came to be 
described as “implementation issues.”  At Seattle, they had pushed for an agreement on 
these issues but were unsuccessful principally due to opposition from the United States.  The 
matter was taken up once again in Doha and culminated in the signing of the Declaration on 
Implementation-related Issues and Concerns. 
Though the title of the package suggests that the issues in it relate to unsatisfactory 
implementation of the UR Agreement, virtually no item involves serious enough violation to 
warrant challenge in DSB.  Indeed, upon close examination, virtually all of the issues 
involve either the implementation of non-binding, best endeavor clauses in the UR 
Agreement or new concessions.  Virtually all the substantive implementation issues have 
landed on the future negotiating agenda of the Doha Ministerial Declaration with developed 
countries mainly offering further “best endeavor,” “good-faith effort” clauses in the 
Decision.   
The emptiness of the Decision is best captured in the official statement by the 
Pakistani representative at Doha, delivered prior to the finalization of the Declaration.  The 
relevant paragraph in the statement states, “The package of implementation measures 
proposed for adoption at Doha is almost a bare cupboard.  Some major countries want to 
  5 take away what little it contains – such as the provision for ‘growth on growth’ in textiles.”  
As it happens, developed countries did not grant the developing country demands relating to 
growth-on-growth of textile and clothing quotas (see below for details).  Instead, the 
Decision calls upon the Council for Trade in Goods to examine speeding up textiles 
liberalization with the aim of making recommendations for action by July 2002. 
The Decision is divided into 14 sections dealing with issues relating to UR 
Agreements on Agriculture, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, Textiles and 
Clothing, Technical barriers to Trade (TBT), Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
Anti-dumping, Customs Valuation, Rules of Origin, Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, and TRIPS.  In most cases, the measures take the form of “taking note” or “best 
endeavor” clauses.  This is amply illustrated by the following discussion of the measures 
proposed in the more important areas. 
Under the so-called “green box” provision, the Agreement on Agriculture exempts 
certain agricultural support programs in developing countries from inclusion into the 
calculation of the Aggregate Support Measure, which is subject to liberalization 
commitments.  These programs, aimed at encouraging agricultural and rural development, 
include investment subsidies that are generally available to agriculture and agricultural 
input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers in 
developing member countries.  The Doha Decision on Implementation-related Issues and 
Concerns “urges” members to exercise restraint in challenging measures notified under the 
green box by developing countries to promote rural development and adequately address 
food security concerns.  This is clearly a “best endeavor” provision that may bring 
additional moral pressure on developed countries at the margin but has no legal standing. 
  6 The UR SPS and TBT Agreements allow Members to introduce legitimate new 
technical standards and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  In some cases, the agreements 
provide the exporting countries short intervals of time to implement these standards and 
measures.  They do not specify the precise lengths of intervals, however, and refer vaguely 
to "longer time-frame for compliance" or "reasonable interval" to introduce the standards, 
instead.  The Decision makes this period precise by stating that it is to be understood to 
mean normally a period of not less than 6 months.   
With respect to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), developing 
countries had sought a faster liberalization of MFA quotas on products of interest to them.  
In response, the Decision offers three clauses promising good-faith effort: (i) developed 
country members should effectively utilize the provisions in ATC for early elimination of 
quota restrictions; (ii) they should exercise particular consideration before initiating 
antidumping investigations of textile and clothing exports from developing countries 
previously subject to quantitative restrictions under ATC for a period of two years; and (iii) 
they shall notify any changes in their rules of origin concerning products falling under the 
coverage of the Agreement to the Committee on Rules of Origin which may decide to 
examine them.   
First two of these items are promises of “good-faith effort” with little recourse in the 
event of non-fulfillment while the third one is simply a notification requirement.  The first 
provision gives developing countries no extra leeway in challenging developed countries on 
the speed of elimination of quota restrictions beyond that available under ATC.  It is not 
clear how, except as already provided under ATC, is one to determine that a country has 
failed to use the provisions relating to the elimination of quotas “effectively.”  Likewise, the 
  7 grounds under which a country can be deemed to have failed to exercise “particular 
consideration” before initiating antidumping investigation are not well defined.  Moral force 
is all developing countries have to enforce compliance. 
As already mentioned, the substantive and specific demands of developing countries 
relating to faster expansion of quotas through more liberal application of growth-on-growth 
provisions were not granted to them in the Decision.  Instead, these have been referred to the 
Council for Trade in Goods for examination and recommendation by July 31, 2002. 
Developing countries had complained for some time that in implementing the 
Agreement on Anti-dumping, developed countries had failed to keep good faith by 
investigating the same firms for dumping the same product repeatedly within a short period 
of time.  The Decision offers a best endeavor clause whereby investigating authorities shall 
pay special attention to petitions targeting a member country for a product for which it had 
already been investigated during the previous 365 days and found not guilty.  Accordingly, 
only if the pre-initiation examination indicates that circumstances have changed, should the 
investigation proceed.  On several other matters relating to the Agreement on Anti-dumping 
raised by developing countries, the Decision instructs the Committee on Anti-dumping to 
make recommendations within 12 months.  
  Finally, with regard to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Venezuela had put forth the proposal that the subsidies measures implemented by 
developing countries to achieve legitimate development goals such as regional growth, 
technology research and development funding, production diversification and development 
and implementation of environmentally sound methods of production be treated as non-
actionable.  The Decision takes note of this proposal and places it among outstanding 
  8 implementation issues on which the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Committee 
must report to the Trade Negotiating Committee by the end of 2002.  It urges Members to 
“exercise due restraint with respect to challenging such measures” in the interim. 
  The Decision relegates all outstanding implementation-related issues, compiled in 
document Job(01)/152/Rev.1, to the Doha Ministerial Declaration.  Developing countries 
have complained that this document has already watered down their original complaints.  
The Doha Ministerial Declaration makes the issues in the document an integral part of the 
future work program in the way described below.   
2.3 Ministerial  Declaration 
The Doha work program, launched by the Doha Ministerial Declaration, can be divided 
into three broad parts: agenda with a clear negotiating mandate, agenda with ambiguous 
negotiating mandate and study program.  In the following, I discuss each of these three parts 
in detail. 
2.3.1  Agenda with a Clear Negotiating Mandate 
The Doha negotiating agenda consists of seven items altogether: implementation, 
agriculture, services, market access for non-agricultural products, trade and environment, 
WTO rules, TRIPS and dispute settlement.  The first six of these items are to constitute a 
single undertaking with January 1, 2005 as the deadline for their completion.  The last item 
is to be wrapped up separately by May 31, 2003.  As discussed in Section 2.3.2, there is 
some ambiguity with respect to the four issues jointly called the Singapore issues. 
(i) Implementation 
  9 The negotiations on the outstanding implementation-related issues are to take place 
on two tracks: (a) issues that appear elsewhere on the agenda with a specific negotiating 
mandate are to be handled according to that mandate; and (b) any other outstanding 
implementation issues are to be addressed by the relevant WTO bodies, which must report 
to the Trade Negotiating Committee by the end of 2002 for appropriate action.  These 
negotiations are an integral part of the single undertaking with early implementation on a 
provisional or final basis permitted on agreements reached prior to January 1, 2005 deadline.  
It may be emphasized that all significant implementation issues have been essentially 
incorporated into the explicit negotiating mandate and fall under (a); items covered under 
(b) are of lesser significance. 
 (ii)  Agriculture 
  The Declaration recognizes the progress in negotiations in agriculture mandated by 
the UR Agreement and commits Members to comprehensive negotiations aimed at 
substantial improvements in market access; reductions, with a view to phasing out, of all 
forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support 
measures.  On export subsidies, EU had objected to the expression “with a view to phasing 
out” but after a day’s delay in concluding the negotiations the United States and Cairns 
Group prevailed upon it.  At the same time, at the insistence of EU, “all forms of export 
subsidies” were included into the negotiations, possibly opening the door to export credits, 
food aid and state-trading enterprises.  The United States had wanted the Declaration to refer 
to “export subsidies” only. 
The Declaration provides strong language for special and differential treatment for 
developing countries: “We agree that special and differential treatment for developing 
  10 countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied 
in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and 
disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing 
countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and 
rural development.”  The requirement that special and differential treatment be embodied 
into the “rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective” is seen as 
an improvement over the language promising good-faith effort in Article 15.1 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
The Declaration takes note of the non-trade concerns “reflected in the negotiating 
proposals submitted by Members” and confirms that non-trade concerns are to be taken into 
account in the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture.  The reference 
to non-trade concerns “reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by Members” is 
viewed as opening gates to the debate on the whole range of these issues.  The EU 
Commissioner on Agriculture, Franz Fischler, interprets this as an avenue to the protection 
of the environment in rural areas as well as to EU proposals aimed at ensuring food safety 
for consumers regardless of whether such food originates at home or abroad. 
 (iii)  Services 
  As in agriculture, the UR Agreement mandated negotiations in services and the 
Declaration essentially recognized the work in progress under that mandate.  It provides 30 
June 2002 as the deadline for initial requests for specific commitments and 31 March 2003 
as the deadline for initial offers.  The preamble to the Declaration reaffirms the right of 
Members under the general Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to regulate and to 
introduce new regulations on the supply of services. 
  11   (iv) Non-agricultural Products 
  Many developing countries had opposed the inclusion of non-agricultural products 
into the agenda though they did not turn it into a make or break issue at Doha.  As a part of 
their implementation-related concerns, developing countries had complained bitterly about 
the peak tariffs applying to products of export interest to them.  The Declaration responds to 
this concern by explicitly agreeing to “reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including 
the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-
tariff barriers, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries.”  
  As in agriculture, the Declaration promises to “take fully into account the special 
needs and interests of developing and least-developed country participants, including 
through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments.”  Included in the Declaration in 
this context are appropriate studies and capacity-building measures to assist least-developed 
countries to participate effectively in the negotiations. 
  (v) Trade and Environment 
The subject of environment has been under study at the WTO under the auspices of 
the Committee on Trade and Environment for some time.  But for the first time, the Doha 
Declaration brings it into the negotiating agenda.  A large number of developing countries 
had been opposed to bringing environment into the negotiating agenda in any form but EU 
had insisted on it.  Fortunately, the negotiating mandate in the Declaration is quite limited 
and unlikely to damage the interests of developing countries significantly.  It calls for 
negotiations on (a) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade 
obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); (b) procedures for 
regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, 
  12 and the criteria for the granting of observer status; and (c) the reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.  With respect to the first subject, the 
Declaration explicitly notes that the negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any 
Member that is not a party to the MEA in question.  This means that trade sanctions by 
MEA signatories on non-signatories are ruled out. 
  Under the mandate relating to WTO rules, the Declaration includes fisheries 
subsidies in the negotiating agenda.  It notes that participants shall aim “to clarify and 
improve WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies, taking into account the importance of this 
sector to developing countries.”  The effort to bring these subsidies, leading to over-fishing, 
had been led by Iceland and supported by the Philippines, Peru and the United States.   
Oddly, EU, which has otherwise championed the cause of environment, and Japan have 
been fiercely opposed to putting these subsidies on the negotiating agenda. 
  (vi) WTO Rules 
  The Declaration opens WTO rules in three areas to negotiation: (1) anti-dumping, 
(2) subsidies and countervailing measures, and (3) regional trade agreements.  Negotiations 
on these items are to aim at clarifying and improving disciplines with special attention paid 
to the needs of developing countries.  With respect to the first two items, the Declaration 
requires negotiations to preserve “the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness” of the 
Agreements on Anti-dumping and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  Negotiations on 
subsidies are to include fisheries subsidies for which environmental groups and developing 
countries, supported by the United States, had pushed hard. 
  (vii) TRIPS Agreement 
  13   The Declaration explicitly mandates negotiations on the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and 
spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference in 2003.  It goes on to state that 
issues related to the extension of the protection of geographical indications to products other 
than wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS as a part of the 
outstanding implementation issues.  There remains disagreement on whether this amounts to 
a negotiating mandate on the extension of geographical indications to products other than 
wines and spirits.  Countries opposed to such negotiations including the United States and 
Cairns group argue that no mandate has been given.  Those favoring such negotiations 
include EU, Bulgaria, India and Sri Lanka. 
  (viii) Dispute Settlement 
  In a short paragraph in the Declaration, Members agree to negotiations on 
improvements and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  The negotiations 
in this area are to be based on the work done to-date as well as any additional proposals 
Members may make.  The Dispute Settlement negotiations are not a part of the single 
undertaking; they are to be completed by May 31 2003 and implemented as soon as possible 
thereafter.  
2.3.2  The Singapore Issues: Ambiguous Mandate 
At Doha, EU had insisted on the inclusion of negotiations for multilateral 
agreements on investment, competition policy, trade facilitation and transparency in 
government procurement.  Since these issues had been made a part of the WTO study 
program under the Singapore Ministerial Declaration in 1996, they are jointly referred to as 
the Singapore issues. 
  14 A large number of developing countries, especially from Asia and Africa, had 
opposed the EU demand.  India was the most vocal opponent and persisted in its demand to 
exclude the four issues from the negotiating mandate until the end at the Doha Ministerial 
Conference.  According to the deliberately vague compromise language in the Declaration, 
members “agree that negotiations will take place after the fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on 
modalities of negotiations.”  Developed countries interpret this phrasing to mean that the 
Fifth Ministerial in 2003 is to decide only on the modalities while the agreement to kick 
off the negotiations soon after that Ministerial is already in place.  Under this 
interpretation, the negotiations will be a part of the single undertaking with the January 1, 
2005 deadline.  Many developing countries take the view that the decision on modalities 
by explicit consensus gives them a veto against the launch of the negotiations themselves.   
At Doha, India took the position that according to the Singapore Declaration, 
negotiations on the Singapore issues could not be launched without explicit consensus.  
Therefore, it insisted on clarification of the language in the Doha Declaration from the 
Conference chair, Yussef Hussain Kamal, in his concluding remarks.  The chair obliged, 
providing the following clarification: 
“Let me say that with respect to the reference to an "explicit consensus" 
being needed … for a decision to be taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference, my understanding is that, at that Session, a decision would indeed need 
to be taken, by explicit consensus, before negotiations on Trade and Investment and 
Trade and Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement, and 
Trade Facilitation could proceed. In my view, this would give each Member the 
  15 right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations from 
proceeding after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference until that Member is 
prepared to join in an explicit consensus."  
This clarification does not lay the differences between the proponents and opponents of the 
Singapore issues to rest, however.  While the chair’s concluding remarks form a part of the 
official conference proceedings, they do not have a legal standing.  Therefore, there remains 
uncertainty as to whether negotiations on the Singapore issues will take place as a part of the 
single undertaking of the Doha Round.   
On three of the four issues, investment, competition policy, and trade facilitation, the 
Declaration does not spell out the scope of potential negotiations.  In the case of investment 
and competition policy, some inferences can be drawn from the charges for future study 
given to the relevant working groups as described below.  On trade facilitation, the 
Declaration does not discuss the study program at all.  On transparency in government 
procurement, the Declaration is slightly more explicit on the scope of negotiations.   
Accordingly, while the negotiations are to build on the progress made in the Working Group 
on Transparency in Government Procurement during the period until the fifth Ministerial 
Conference, the scope of negotiations is limited to the transparency aspect of procurement.  
The Declaration explicitly rules our restrictions on preferences given by countries to 
domestic supplies and suppliers.   
2.3.3 Study  Program 
The Doha Declaration lays down a wide-ranging study program that includes trade 
and investment; trade and competition policy; trade and environment; intellectual property; 
electronic commerce; small economies; trade, debt and finance; trade and transfer of 
  16 technology; and special and differential treatment for developing countries.  In addition, the 
Declaration calls for technical assistance to and capacity building in developing and least 
developed countries through a variety of mechanisms, agencies and forums.  Some 
highlights of the study program are as follows. 
The Declaration asks the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and 
Investment to focus on a wide range of topics including scope and definition, transparency, 
non-discrimination, modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type 
positive-list approach, development provisions, exceptions and balance-of-payments 
safeguards, consultation and the settlement of disputes between Members.  Any framework 
is to reflect the interests of home and host countries in a balanced manner and take due 
account of the development policies and objectives of host governments as well as their 
right to regulate in the public interest.   
The Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy has 
been asked to focus its work on core principles including transparency, non-discrimination 
and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary 
cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in 
developing countries through capacity building.  The charge on hardcore cartels has raised 
expectations in some quarters that eventually competition policy may take on global cartels 
such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), though it is not clear if 
that is the intention behind the inclusion of “provisions on hardcore cartels” in the Doha 
study program on competition policy.  
The Committee on Trade and Environment has been asked to focus its future work 
on (i) the effect of environmental measures on market access including the identification of 
  17 situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would 
benefit trade, the environment and development; (ii) the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and (iii) labeling 
requirements for environmental purposes.  The Committee is to report to the Fifth Session of 
the Ministerial Conference and make recommendations on future action including the 
desirability of negotiations.  Thus, the door to future expansion of trade and environment 
negotiating agenda is open. 
On intellectual property, Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement excludes plants 
and animals other than microorganisms and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes 
from being subject to patents.  The Declaration instructs the Council for TRIPS to include 
in its work program the review of the relationship between this provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional 
knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by Members under the 
review provisions in Article 71.1 of the Agreement.  Brazil and India have championed the 
cause of the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.  They and many other 
developing countries have welcomed the language in the Declaration linking this subject to 
Article 27.3(b).  The United States and EU had previously resisted WTO discussions on 
these issues arguing that the World Intellectual Property Organization should cover them.  
  Other areas covered by the work program are electronic commerce; small 
economies; trade, debt and finance; trade and transfer of technology; and special and 
differential treatment for developing countries.  On electronic commerce, the Declaration 
calls for continuation of the Work Program initiated since the Ministerial Declaration of 20 
  18 May 1998 in the General Council and other bodies.  On small economies, a work program is 
to be launched under the auspices of the General Council to examine issues relating to the 
fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system.  On 
trade, debt and finance, a Working Group is to be established to come up with 
recommendations on steps that might be taken within the mandate and competence of the 
WTO to enhance the capacity of the multilateral trading system to contribute to a durable 
solution to the problem of external indebtedness of developing and least-developed 
countries.  On trade and transfer of technology, a working group is to be set up with the 
mandate to recommend steps that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to 
increase flows of technology to developing countries.  Finally, on special and differential 
treatment, the Declaration takes note of the Framework Agreement on Special and 
Differential Treatment proposed by some Members.  All special and differential treatment 
provisions are to be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more 
precise, effective and operational. 
3  Why Developing Countries Oppose the Singapore Issues 
Before I turn to an assessment of the Doha outcome, it is useful to discuss briefly the 
reasons why many developing countries in Africa and Asia opposed the inclusion of the 
Singapore issues into the negotiating agenda.
3  This is especially essential since the WTO 
                                                 
3 The press reports published immediately following the Doha Ministerial Conference give the 
impression that the Singapore issues were opposed mainly by India.  In reality, a broad spectrum of 
developing countries including the ACP countries and many Asian developing countries had 
expressed opposition to the inclusion of one or more of these issues at Doha.  Official statements, 
delivered at Doha by Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and 
Thailand among others, support this assertion. 
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position.
4 
  To appreciate fully the position of developing countries, it must be recognized at the 
outset that their opposition to multilateral agreements on these issues is not to be equated 
with opposition to the policies underlying the latter.  Few developing countries reject the 
positive role that trade facilitation, transparency in government procurement and investment 
and competition polices can play in the process of development.  Indeed, many of them have 
introduced policy reforms in these areas as a part of their national reform programs in recent 
years and benefited from them.  For instance, through progressive opening of the foreign 
investment regime, India has seen its annual foreign investment rise from a paltry 200 
million dollars in 1990 to 5 billion dollars currently. 
Furthermore, the opposition to multilateral agreements on all four issues by any one 
developing country is unlikely to be equally intense.  Many countries would probably find a 
multilateral agreement on transparency in government procurement far less objectionable 
than that on investment.  And some will go so far as to endorse it.  From this perspective, 
placing the four issues into a single basket is misleading since it gives a country opposed to 
any one or more issues the appearance of being opposed to all of them.  To alleviate this 
                                                 
4 See Moore (2002). Indeed, prior to writing this article, Moore had defended the EU Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy and by implication criticized the Indian Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran for the 
stance they took at Doha.  Following the criticism of Maran in the Financial Times (November 15, 
2001) as the “villain” of Doha, when a Member of the European Parliament (Greens, Sweden), Per 
Gahrton, wrote in a letter to the newspaper (November 24 2001) defending Maran as a “defeated 
hero of a common Third World cause” and offering Lamy as the candidate for the pejorative label of 
“villain” instead, Moore surprisingly came to Lamy’s defense.  In a letter written four days later 
(November 28 2001), he went on to defend Lamy on every one of his stances and in the process 
provided a spirited endorsement of his comprehensive agenda including even labor standards.  For 
details, see Panagariya (2002). 
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multilateral agreement on investment and then transitioning into objections that are more 
generally applicable.
5  
First, when we consider political constraints to liberalization, there is a hierarchy of 
sectors: trade is easier to liberalize than investment, which is easier to liberalize than labor. 
Within trade, goods trade is easier to liberalize than services trade.  Within investment, 
direct foreign investment is easier to liberalize than portfolio investment.  And finally, 
within labor, opening to immigration of skilled labor is easier than to unskilled labor.   
Today, despite full appreciation of the economic benefits of labor mobility, 
developed countries would find a binding international agreement on the movement of even 
skilled labor politically infeasible.  They recognize the need for more flexibility in this 
sphere than an international agreement would permit.  Many developing countries find 
themselves in a similar situation with respect to investment flows: politics demands 
discretion in how investment liberalization proceeds.  Some countries are particularly 
worried with respect to acceding to a multilateral agreement that extends to portfolio 
investment since it happens to be more liquid and prone to a sudden flight leading to crisis. 
This difficulty is amply illustrated by the experience with the liberalization of trade 
in services, which is intimately linked to the liberalization of investment and labor flows.  
Developing countries have been much more reluctant to make binding commitments in 
                                                 
5 According to the detailed postmortem of the Doha Ministerial Conference in ICSD (2001), there 
remain continued divisions between developed and developing countries on these issues.  Referring 
to the vague wording on the launch of negotiations on them in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the 
ICSD report states, “Many developed Members consider this as a mandate to launch negotiations at 
the fifth Ministerial or shortly thereafter, whereas most developing countries maintain that the 
negotiations may be years off, as a decision to launch them must be taken by explicit consensus.” 
 
  21 services under GATS than in goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).  Where liberalization of trade in services requires labor mobility, even developed 
countries have taken wholesale exceptions in their GATS commitment schedules. 
The second reason for the opposition to a multilateral investment agreement is that 
many developing countries feel that before they commit to negotiations, they should be 
reasonably sure that benefits of a future agreement outweigh the risks of trade sanctions.  
Unlike goods, which they export as well as import, on the investment front, they are only 
importers.  In mercantilist terms, this means that under an investment agreement they will be 
making binding commitments without receiving anything in return.   
This fact has substantive distributional implications.  Thus, for example, suppose 
that the rate of return on investment in China is 10 percent and that in EU 5 percent.  When 
the EU capital moves into China, it appropriates the excess return.  While China also 
benefits from the inflow in many ways, should it nevertheless give up its right to tax away a 
part of the extra 5 percent return by committing to national treatment to foreign capital?  
Questions such as these have simply been ignored by those who are wedded to national 
treatment. 
The third reason, which applies to all Singapore issues, is that many developing 
countries lack the capacity to negotiate effectively on a wide-ranging agenda.  The problem 
is not merely one of financial resources.  Even if developed countries were to offer a offer a 
liberal does of financial resources—which they have not done to-date despite promises 
under the UR Agreement—, human resources cannot be created overnight.  Those of us who 
have worked with scholars and policy makers in developing countries are acutely aware of 
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too many competing objectives chase a tiny pool of such resources. 
Fourth, based on the experience with the UR Agreement, some developing countries 
fear that they will fail to implement the negotiated agreements in a timely fashion and be left 
exposed to the risk of trade sanctions.  This clearly turned out to be the case with the TRIPS 
Agreement.  India was pursued by the United States in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
for its failure to comply with the letter of the Agreement even though it had complied with 
its spirit.  And absent the ten-year extension given by the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, many least developed countries would have found 
themselves in even greater difficulty in five years’ time.   
Finally, since developed countries already meet the standards likely to be negotiated 
with respect to the Singapore issues, as was the case with the TRIPS Agreement, these 
issues place a greater burden at the margin on developing countries.  Effectively, developing 
countries will be the ones to take on to new obligations.  Moreover, from the national 
standpoint, it is not clear that the implementation of these agreements on a priority basis 
represents the best use of the limited resources and political goodwill available to the 
governments.  For example, one must ask if the return to the resources deployed to ensure 
speedy movement of goods at the border under a future agreement on trade facilitation 
might not be higher if deployed in speeding up the movement of goods internally or in 
altogether different projects.  Likewise, we must ask if the government should give priority 
to competition policy over so many other more pressing reforms that preoccupy legislative 
bodies and enforcement authorities. 
  23 4  Legacy of the UR Agreement and the Doha Outcome 
Let us now turn to an evaluation of the Doha outcome.
6  This requires a look back at 
some aspects of the UR Agreement.  A recurring theme of many civil society groups and 
press reports in the post-UR years has been that the UR Agreement shortchanged 
developing countries.  According to them, promises of large benefits made to developing 
countries during and immediately after the negotiations have not translated into reality.   
Supported by these civil society groups, developing countries had demanded that the 
imbalance in the UR Agreement be corrected at Doha.  The key question to be addressed in 
this section is whether the civil society groups and press reports were right about the 
imbalance and if yes, whether the Doha outcome corrects it.  I argue that there is some truth 
in the complaint though the imbalance has perhaps been overstated and benefits from trade 
liberalization to developing countries somewhat understated.  I then argue that while the 
Doha outcome is better balanced than the UR Agreement, we are in danger of making the 
opposite error here: overstating the benefits from the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health and Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns.  I conclude 
the section by arguing that the better-balanced outcome at Doha should not be confused with 
a softening of the negotiating stance on the part of developed countries. 
4.1  UR Agreement:  Developing Countries Shortchanged? 
The case that the UR Agreement shortchanged developing countries is based on three 
principal observations.   
                                                 
6 Throughout the paper, I use the term “Doha outcome” to refer to the totality of the achievements at 
Doha, which include the three documents described in Section 2 as also those described in footnote 
2. 
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Asia and Latin America with high potential for agricultural exports, had expected the UR 
Agreement on Agriculture to deliver significantly increased market access for farm products 
of its member countries.  This expectation was not realized. 
The Agreement on Agriculture required members to covert all non-tariff barriers into 
tariff equivalents taking 1986-88 as the base period.  These tariff equivalents were to be 
added to the existing tariffs and the total tariff bound.  Developed countries were to then 
reduce each of these tariffs by at least 15 percent, achieving an overall average reduction of 
36 percent over a six-year period ending January 1, 2000.  Developing countries were 
allowed smaller reductions and given longer transition period. 
Predictably, countries chose tariff equivalents of the 1986-88 non-tariff barriers that 
were far higher than their “true” counterparts.   According to Ingco (1995), the proportion 
by which the announced equivalent tariff rate exceeded the actual equivalent tariff rate (i.e., 
"dirty tariffication") was 61% for EU and 44% for the United States.  In addition, the 
modalities negotiated for the 36% average tariff reduction with 15% reduction in the tariff 
on each product allowed countries to get away with minimal tariff reductions.  For example, 
a country with 100% tariffs on three products and 4% on the remaining one could lower the 
former by 15%, eliminate the latter, and achieve (15+15+15+100)/4 = 36.25% average 
reduction.  The outcome of the dirty tariffication and this flexibility offered by the 
modalities of liberalization sealed the fate of effective liberalization in agriculture.   
The second reason why the UR Agreement has been viewed as imbalanced is that in the 
area of market access in industrial products, developing countries committed to cutting their 
tariffs more deeply than developed countries.  According to the calculations done by Finger 
  25 and Schuknecht (1999), the two sets of countries committed to tariff cuts of 2.7 and 1 
percent, respectively, on approximately equal proportions of their imports.   
A key concession in industrial products made by developed countries was the phase out 
of the MFA quotas by January 1, 2005.  These quotas place strict limits on the imports of 
textiles and clothing into developed countries such as the United States, EU and Canada.  
ATC provides that the quotas be phased out over a ten year period.  According to the 
timetable negotiated under the agreement, products accounting for 51 percent of textiles and 
clothing imports (based on 1990 import volumes) were to be freed up by January 1, 2002 in 
three separate installments.  Quotas on products accounting for the remaining 49 percent of 
the imports are to be withdrawn on January 1, 2005.  In addition, ATC provides modest 
increases in the growth rates of quotas established in the original bilateral MFA agreements.   
Developing countries had complained prior to the Doha Conference that the 
liberalization under ATC in the initial phases had yielded them virtually no expansion of 
market access.  Developed countries had been able to meet their obligations by removing 
quotas on products that were de facto unrestricted but included in the ATC schedule of 
sectors to be liberalized or commercially insignificant for developing countries.
7  
Developing countries also complained that the growth in quotas during the transition had 
been inadequate and demanded higher growth rates. 
Finally, in new areas such as intellectual property, developing countries are required to 
adopt standards already prevalent in developed countries.  This means they have 
                                                 
7 In the first two installments, due on the first days of 1995 and 1998, respectively, developed 
countries were to eliminate quotas on products accounting for a total of 33 percent of their textiles 
and clothing imports.  Among the products “freed up” as a part of these installments, restricted items 
accounted for 13 out of 750 for the United States, 14 out of 219 for EU and 29 out of 295 for 
Canada. 
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World Bank project experience, Finger and Schular (2000) concluded that implementation 
in just three areas, customs valuation, TRIPS, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
would cost each country some 150 million dollars.  For many least developed countries, 
this amount exceeds their full year’s development budget.   
This administrative cost is in addition to the economic costs that may result from the 
TRIPS obligations.  For example, the TRIPS Agreement requires a 20-year patent on all 
innovations.  Since much of the innovation activity is concentrated in developed countries, 
developing countries stand to pay potentially large sums of royalties to them.  More 
importantly, given the low levels of income in developing countries and the lack of public 
resources, the patents can effectively deny them access to life-saving medicines altogether.   
These factors point to substantial asymmetry in the distribution of the benefits from 
the UR Agreement between developing and developed countries.  Some may even assert 
that on net the Agreement actually hurt the interests of developing countries.  But such a 
conclusion is unwarranted.  While the balance of benefits was in favor of developed 
countries reflecting their greater bargaining power, developing countries made significant 
gains as well.   
To explain why, begin by considering four points with respect to concessions in trade.  
First, following the mercantilist logic, negotiators view a country’s own liberalization to be a 
cost and that of its trading partners a benefit.  But economics tells us that a country own 
liberalization is a benefit rather than cost since it eliminates domestic inefficiencies and 
stimulates growth as illustrated by the experiences of the large number of countries in Asia.  
This is especially true of economies that do not have market power, as is true of most 
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countries are to be viewed as benefit, not cost. 
Second, even if we insist on thinking in mercantilist terms, whether bargains were 
balanced or not depends on precise manner in which we evaluate them.  For example, the 
calculations by Finger and Schuknecht (1999) report that tariff cuts by developed and 
developing countries applied to equal proportion of their imports.  But in so far as 
developed countries import much more in absolute terms, the absolute market access given 
by them by 1 percent tariff cut is larger than one percent cut in tariffs by developing 
countries. 
Also at issue is whether we should evaluate tariff cuts in terms of average reciprocity 
or marginal (first-difference) reciprocity.  Developing countries had substantially higher 
industrial tariffs than developed countries prior to the Uruguay Round.  If the eventual goal 
of the negotiations is to achieve worldwide free trade, which amounts to average reciprocity, 
developing countries must necessarily liberalize more at the margin. 
Third, in so far as the back loading of the MFA liberalization is concerned, it must be 
acknowledged that developed countries should have liberalized this important sector faster 
in their own interest.  Given that quota rents associated with the MFA restraints accrue to the 
exporting countries, the benefit to developed countries from the removal of quotas is even 
larger than from the removal of tariffs.  That said it bears reminding that during the UR 
negotiations, many of the poorer developing countries themselves did not want faster 
dismantling of the quotas on products exported by them.
8  They were not confident that after 
                                                 
8 B. K. Zutshi, the Permanent Representative and Ambassador of India to GATT from 1989 to 1994, 
conveyed this to the author in personal conversations. 
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quotas.  For some countries such as India, quota utilization rates had been well below 100 
percent in many products implying that their ability to compete would be reduced once 
quotas are dismantled.  Even at Doha, the specific demands by poorer developing countries 
in this area focused on quota expansion rather than their faster removal and on reductions in 
peak tariffs. 
Finally, while the Cairns Group did fail to achieve its expectations in agriculture, the 
UR Agreement helped it lay down the foundation of future liberalization in this important 
sector.  The hopes of liberalization under the Doha round are derived from the success 
achieved in tariffication of non-tariff barriers and identification of export subsidies and 
domestic support measures made possible by the UR Agreement.  
The evidence for asymmetry in the distribution of benefits from the UR Agreement 
must thus be sought in areas outside of trade liberalization.  Here the balance has been 
against developing countries.  In addition to the administrative costs of meeting new 
obligations, outcomes in these areas are not necessarily mutually beneficial.  In the case of 
the TRIPS Agreement, developing countries do stand to make substantial transfers to 
developing countries in terms of higher prices of patented products, especially medicines.   
Thus, as I noted in Panagariya (1999a), and Finger and Nogues (2001) have document 
more systematically, the imbalance in the bargain between developing and developed 
countries is the result of a bargain that tried to balance trade concessions, particularly the 
dismantling of MFA quotas, against non-trade concessions such as TRIPS Agreement.   
Developed countries benefited from trade liberalization on both sides as well as the non-
  29 trade concessions given by developing countries.  Developing countries benefited from trade 
liberalization but were damaged in non-trade areas. 
But even this last conclusion must be qualified in one important way.  A strengthened 
WTO under the UR Agreement is worth substantial intangible benefits to developing 
countries.  Its dispute settlement process protects their trading rights the same way as of 
developed countries.
9  In addition, despite the dominance of developed countries and 
skewed distribution of the bargaining power, WTO offers them a rules-based forum at 
which to defend their trading interests and rights.  For example, it is the strength of WTO 
that allowed them to successfully deflect the pressures for a link between trade and labor 
standards.  In its absence, in principle, developed countries could have simply resorted to 
trade sanctions against countries deemed to have lower labor standards than some pre-
specified level. 
A final point must be made with regard to the manner in which civil society groups 
and developing countries came to view the UR Agreement.  The disappointment of these 
entities resulted at least in part from the unrealistic expectations built up during the 
negotiations by researchers and officials at international institutions, especially the World 
Bank.  Researchers at these institutions produced numerical estimates of benefits to 
developing countries that were overly optimistic.  Many of the studies went so far as to 
predict large benefits from liberalization in agriculture notwithstanding the fact that 
meaningful liberalization in this area was not even a part of the proposed Agreement on 
Agriculture.  Public relations officers at these institutions added to the optimism by choosing 
                                                 
9 For example, challenges by Costa Rica and India to the introduction of new MFA quotas by 
developed countries in the DSB successfully put an end to the practice of bringing competitive 
exporters under a new bilateral quota even as ATC was being implemented.  See Reinert (2000). 
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most plausible even by the authors themselves.
10 
In the policy writings originating in these institutions, there was rather limited 
appreciation of the point that the TRIPS Agreement would result in a substantial 
redistribution of income from the poor to rich countries and that it would severely limit poor 
countries’ access to cheap medicines.  There was a natural tendency on the part of the 
authors to downplay this redistributive effect and focus instead on the presumed benefits to 
developing countries from increased innovation, research on tropical diseases and favorable 
impact on investment.
11  Moreover, simulation studies that generated numerical estimates of 
benefits from the UR Agreements uniformly left the TRIPS Agreement out of consideration 
thereby overstating the benefits to developing countries and understating those to developed 
countries.
12 
4.2  Doha Outcome: Balance Restored? 
The Doha documents have the appearance of taking a more development-friendly 
approach to the next round of negotiations and perhaps attempting to correct the imbalance 
in the UR Agreement.  For example, the Doha Ministerial Declaration uses the expression 
                                                 
10 For details, see Panagariya (1999b).  In some of his public speeches in 1999, Rubens Ricupero, 
Secretary General, UNCTAD, questioned these predictions, characterizing them as “extravagant”. 
Jagdish Bhagwati had warned even as the Uruguay Round was approaching closure that appeals to 
overly optimistic predictions that were close to PR fiction could undermine the credibility of trade 
liberalization. 
11 For example, see Primo Braga (1996). 
12 Raising the issue of appropriate governance in his widely read recent book, Bhagwati (2002, p. 76) 
draws a contrast between the work done on intellectual property protection (IPP) at GATT and 
World Bank.  According to him, the only institution whose staff was allowed to write clearly and 
skeptically about IPP at the time of the Uruguay Round was the GATT whereas “the World Bank 
played along with IPP, even trying to produce reasons why it was good for the poor countries.” 
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While this appearance fails to stand up to a closer, more critical scrutiny, let me explain first 
why some analysts think the Doha outcome has gone some ways towards correcting the 
imbalance in the UR Agreement.  
4.2.1  The Positive Case 
The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health gives developing 
countries some reprieve in the area of medicines through increased flexibility in the use of 
compulsory licensing.  It also gives the least developed countries an extra ten years to 
implement patent protection in the area of medicines. The Decision on Implementation-
related Issues and Concerns addresses a number of complaints put forth by developing 
countries.   
The Doha Declaration contains repeated mentions of the special circumstances of 
developing and least developed countries that must be taken into account by the negotiations 
and contains innumerable references to “special and differential” treatment for them.  It also 
offers a separate section on the problems of “small economies.”  As much as 15 percent of 
the space in the Declaration—one and a half page out of a total of ten pages—is devoted 
exclusively to sections entitled “Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building” and “Least 
Developed Countries.”  
The negotiating agenda of the Doha Declaration explicitly includes the outstanding 
implementation issues raised by developing countries as a separate item.  In agriculture, the 
objective of complete removal of export subsidies sought by the Cairns Group has been 
incorporated into the negotiating mandate.  Developed countries have formally placed the 
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-
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agenda.  For the first time, subsidies on fisheries have appeared on the negotiating agenda.  
Arguably, extension of protection to geographical indications to products other than wines 
and spirits, demanded by some developing countries, has also been placed on the negotiating 
agenda. 
The study program of the Doha Declaration contains a number of new items that were 
put on the agenda by developing countries.  The agreement to study the problems of “small 
economies” under the auspices of the General Council and to appoint Working Groups on 
Trade, Debt and Finance and Trade and Transfer of Technology are the direct outcome of 
the demands of developing countries.  As per the demands of developing countries, 
especially Brazil and India, the Declaration also instructs the TRIPS Council to examine the 
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments. 
4.2.2  The Negative Case 
Consider first the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.  Other 
than the ten-year extension to the least developed countries on the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement in the area of medicines, the key concession in it is that relating to 
compulsory licensing.  Recall that the provision for compulsory licensing had existed in the 
original TRIPS Agreement.  What the Declaration does is to possibly weaken the conditions 
under which such licenses may be granted.  It gives countries the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency when it chooses 
to issue a compulsory license without prior effort by the licensee to obtain manufacturing 
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substantial additional gains over the provision in the original TRIPS Agreement?   
There are two separate reasons why the answer is in the negative.  First, the country 
will still need to justify the circumstances constituting national emergency or extreme 
urgency.  A simple assertion by it is unlikely to go unchallenged in the Dispute Settlement 
Body.  Under the most favorable scenario, the Declaration may have weakened the standard 
of proof for this purpose.  But under the worst-case scenario, it may have done the opposite 
by implicitly defining the standards for emergencies and extreme urgencies in terms of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.  The force of the provision in the 
Declaration will become clear only after the countries test its boundaries through grant of 
compulsory licenses under circumstances that are then disputed as non-emergency 
situations.   
Second, most developing countries simply do not have domestic capacity to produce 
medicines.  As such, they are not in a position to take advantage of the provision in the first 
place.  Developing countries had sought the rights to issue compulsory licenses to producers 
in other countries but developed countries ducked the issue at least temporarily by referring 
the matter to the TRIPS Council.   
Next, consider the Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns.  From 
the detailed discussion above, it is clear that in terms of actual concessions, this document 
delivers little to developing countries.  It fails to grant even the relatively minor concession 
of applying the most favorable methodology to growth-on-growth provisions of ATC in 
calculating the quota growth for the remainder of the transition period.  All substantive 
issues have been relegated to future negotiations. 
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future negotiations.  But the realization of such a hope is unlikely.  Any new concessions 
from developed countries will have to be matched by new concessions by developing 
countries.  The Doha Declaration makes ample mention of special and differential treatment 
but much of it is of cosmetic nature.  The main substantive provision relates to trade 
liberalization.  But even here, an important qualification applies.  Trade liberalization by 
developing countries is in their own interest.  Therefore, any special treatment in this area, 
though viewed as such by the countries, ultimately hurts their own interest.
13 
4.2.3  The Bottom line 
Lest this discussion leaves a pessimistic impression of the Doha outcome, let me 
hasten to point out that the failure of the Doha outcome to significantly correct the 
imbalance in the UR Agreement is no reason to conclude that it fails to advance the interests 
of developing countries.  When taken by itself, the Doha negotiating agenda is to be 
welcomed from the viewpoint of developing countries.  It manages to exclude trade and 
labor from the mandate entirely.  Arguably, it also excludes the contentious Singapore issues 
from negotiations.  The core negotiating agenda focuses on trade liberalization, which offers 
the scope for “win-win” bargains.  While many developing countries would have preferred 
to keep trade and environment out of the negotiating agenda, so far the mandate in this area 
is limited.  Given the pressures that have existed on bringing environment into the WTO 
negotiating agenda, they could have fared worse.  Finally, in the area of WTO rules, at least 
                                                 
13 See Bhagwati and Panagariya (2001) on this issue. 
  35 prima facie, developing countries are likely to gain rather than lose.  Therefore, on balance, 
the Doha outcome is an unambiguous improvement over the UR Agreement. 
4.3  Did Developed Countries Soften their Negotiating Stance at Doha? 
Given some success in pushing through the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health and a negotiating agenda that includes a large number items championed 
by developing countries, it is tempting to conclude that there has been some softening of 
stance on the part of developed countries towards granting genuine concessions to 
developing countries.  I will argue, however, that little has changed in this regard: developed 
countries remain as hard-nosed as in the UR negotiations. 
The credit for pushing through the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health must go largely to civil society groups from both North and South, which spoke with 
one voice and rallied behind an undeniably worthy cause.  Their efforts, backed by repeated 
front-page stories of the AIDS epidemic in Africa and the inability of most Africans to 
afford life-saving medicines in newspapers sensitized the public in developed countries to a 
point that inaction was no longer an option.  If we combine this fact with the doubts 
expressed above with respect to the true extra value of the concessions given, it stands to 
reason that developed countries have walked away with as good a deal as was feasible under 
the circumstances. 
More direct evidence of the continued tough stance of developed countries comes 
from the outcome on the implementation issues on which developing countries had to carry 
the fight almost entirely on their own and without the benefit of the support of civil society 
groups or a subset of developed countries.  The disconnect between the expression of the 
desire to accommodate the interests of developing countries in the Doha Declaration and 
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example, take the developing country demand for a commitment that member countries will 
not bring another anti-dumping suit against the same country for one year following a 
negative finding in an anti-dumping suit against it.  By all standards, such a commitment 
would seem to be a reasonable insurance against harassment suits with protectionist 
motives.  Moreover, the number of actual suits filed against the same party within less than 
one year of a negative finding against it is probably small.  Therefore, the political cost of 
the concession facing developed countries was small.  Nevertheless, they did not agree to 
such a commitment, instead agreeing only to a best-endeavor clause in the Decision on 
Implementation-related Issues and Concerns.  As discussed in detail above, the fate of other 
implementation-related demands was similar. 
With a handful of exceptions noted below, developing country demands resulted in 
positive outcomes only when accompanied by support from one or more major developed 
countries.  In the grant of Article I exception to the ACP-EC Partnership (Cotonou) 
Agreement, EU was a major player.  The phrase relating to the phase out of export subsidies 
was inserted at the behest of the United States.  The provision that the negotiations on the 
relationship between MEAs and existing WTO rules not prejudice the WTO rights of 
members not party to the MEA in question was sought by the United States.  The “friends of 
fish” including Iceland and the United States supported the inclusion of fisheries subsidies 
into the negotiating agenda.  Japan pushed for the inclusion of anti-dumping rules into the 
agenda and EU that of the extension of geographical indications to products other than 
wines and liquors. 
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between the rhetoric on technical cooperation and capacity building in the Ministerial 
declaration and the willingness of developed countries to commit resource for this purpose.  
Much is made of technical assistance to and capacity building in developing countries 
throughout the Declaration and was cited as a major achievement of developing countries by 
WTO Director General Mike Moore in his Financial Times article (Moore 2002) wooing 
them to come on board the negotiations on the Singapore issues.  Yet, in terms of actual 
commitment, the Declaration is limited to ensuring “long-term funding for WTO technical 
assistance at an overall level of no lower than of the current year.”  Given the hugely 
inadequate level of funding for capacity building in the past year, few developing countries 
can feel reassured by this commitment.
14 
There are three main areas in which developing countries may be said to have won 
battles entirely on their own.  First, they managed to put the reductions in or elimination of 
peak tariffs and tariff escalation in products of export interest to them explicitly on the 
negotiating agenda.  Second, they successfully pushed a number of items of direct interest to 
them on the study agenda.  Among other things, these include protection to traditional 
knowledge and folklore, which had been opposed by both the United States and EU.   
Finally, they had at least partial success in keeping the negotiations on the Singapore issues 
from being launched.   
Even this partial success of developing countries must be explained, not in terms of 
any softening of developed country stance in the negotiations but two other reasons, both 
                                                 
14 Recently, an agreement has been reached to allocate $17.6 million for this activity, which, though 
twice of the sum made available last year, remains tiny when spread over the large number of 
countries that need technical assistance. 
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Trade Center, the United States was determined to launch the new round as a signal of 
America’s strength and resolve to maintain an open global economy.  Therefore, it was 
prepared to make some concessions that it would have resisted making under more normal 
circumstances.  Second, having promoted the proposed round as a development round, to 
some degree, developed countries found it difficult to proceed without the participation of 
one or more major developing countries.  This fact gave India just enough leverage to insert 
the language requiring “explicit consensus” on the modalities for launching negotiations on 
the Singapore issues.  Even then, India’s Commerce Minister paid a heavy cost in terms of 
personal reputation: the Financial Times (November 15, 2001) branded him the “worst 
villain” and the Economist (November 17, 2001) accused him of  “almost scuttling” the 
Doha deal. 
5  Asymmetries between Developing and Developed Countries 
A recognition of the asymmetries between developed and developing countries is 
essential to thinking about future negotiating strategies for individual developing countries 
as well as groups of them.  Two broad sources of symmetry may be considered. 
5.1 Bargaining  Power 
Three factors contribute heavily to the asymmetry in the effective bargaining power 
exercised by developed and developing countries.  First, developed-country members 
account for the bulk of the world trade.  This means they are in a better position to offer 
carrots and sticks in the negotiations and thus to divide and rule than their counterparts.  
Second, developed country members are fewer in number, with three of them—the United 
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negotiations with relative ease and thus overcome the free-rider problem.  In turn this 
permits a more effective exercise of the bargaining power.  Finally, being at relatively 
similar levels of per-capita incomes, these countries exhibit greater similarity and coherence 
in policy regimes in areas such as intellectual property rights, environmental regulations, 
and investment policies where negotiating positions often divide along North-South lines.  
This makes compromise among them easier even when their detailed individual positions 
differ.  For instance, the United States was not keen on launching negotiations on trade and 
environment at Doha but could make common cause with EU on it at a relatively low or no 
political cost to itself.  Likewise, at Seattle, EU was not keen to bring labor standards into 
WTO but was willing to aid the United States in promoting its position. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, have very limited bargaining power due 
to their much lower share in the world markets.  Even more importantly, they are too 
numerous, lack truly large players, are at very different levels of income, and subject to 
diverse policy regimes.  This makes the development of common positions among them 
difficult.  And even when such positions exist among many of them, its effective exercise is 
difficult. The possibility of a free ride on the common cause makes it more attractive for 
them to expend their individual negotiating capital on narrowly defined objectives.  This 
makes them easier targets for being “bought off” on the common objective in return for 
concessions on the narrowly defined objective.   
These points are well reflected in the dynamics of negotiations on the Singapore 
issues as it unfolded at Doha.  A significant number of developing countries had been 
opposed to negotiations on these issues.  But the opposition could not claim the unanimous 
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of incomes, and preoccupation with agricultural liberalization, countries in Latin America 
were not especially opposed to the negotiations.  Much of the opposition came from 
countries in Africa and Asia.   
The countries in African were eventually co-opted, however, once they were 
granted the Article I waiver on the EC-ACP (Cotonou) Partnership Agreement.  These 
countries expended all their negotiating capital on the waiver, choosing to free ride on the 
Singapore issues.  Likewise, the countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand, chose not to push the issue presumably because they too found it 
unattractive to devote resources to a battle that India had already made its own.  Therefore, 
at the end of the day, only India, which felt it had enough at stake to carry on the fight and 
was regarded as an important player by developed countries perhaps in recognition of its 
very large size in terms of population, persisted.  It had partial success albeit at a high cost in 
terms of public image as noted above. 
5.2    Asymmetries in Research and Strategic Thinking 
In terms of research and strategic thinking and preparation, there is no match between 
developed and developing countries.  In developed countries, there are a number of think 
tanks and independent researchers researching the issues and providing intellectual input to 
the government negotiating agencies.  Such is the sophistication of this activity that 
sometimes researchers even simulate the negotiations to predict the likely responses of their 
rivals.  In addition, both executive and legislative branches of the government maintain staff, 
which study and analyze the impact of negotiations on various constituencies on a regular 
basis.  Interest groups in turn are able to lobby for their positions with these agencies.   
  41 In contrast, a large number of developing countries are simply too small to be able to 
muster any resources at all for either research or strategic thinking.  But even the larger ones 
have limited capacity and organization to carry out research and strategic thinking to define 
negotiating positions and develop response strategies.  There are few think tanks or 
independent researchers to provide serious intellectual input.  Indeed, most countries 
ultimately depend on international agencies such as WTO and multilateral development 
banks, which are not neutral players themselves. 
6  Summary and the Way Forward 
The main conclusions of this paper may be summarized as follows: 
1.  The Doha agenda, which focuses principally on trade liberalization, is a 
welcome development from the viewpoint of developing countries.  The 
agenda includes several items of specific interest to developing countries and 
excludes labor standards even from the study program.   
2.  Developing countries have legitimate reasons for objecting to the inclusion of 
some of the Singapore issue in the negotiating agenda.  These include 
asymmetries in the obligations that they must undertake in these areas and in 
the distribution of benefits, limited capacity to negotiate and limited resources 
for implementation. 
3.  While both developing and developed countries benefited from the UR 
Agreement, the balance was in favor of developed countries.  The Doha 
outcome does not correct this imbalance but does offer a better balance 
between the interests of developing and developed countries when taken by 
itself. 
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shift in the relative bargaining powers of developing and developed countries.  
Nor does it suggest any softening of the negotiating stance on the part of 
developed countries.   
5.  In negotiations, developing countries face several asymmetries.  Given their 
very large share in world trade, developed countries have much of the 
bargaining power.  Moreover, since three of them—the United States, EU and 
Japan—are large, they are better able to solve the free-rider problem of 
negotiations. The position of developing countries is the opposite. 
6.  Developing countries also suffer from poor research capacity and a lack of 
strategic thinking.  In contrast, research and strategic thinking are carried out at 
a highly sophisticated level in developed countries. 
Evidently, it is too much to expect dramatic changes in the relative bargaining power 
and its exercise.  But developing countries can make a difference at the margin.  In 
particular, the following suggestions can be made to enhance and effectively deploy their 
negotiating power.
15 
First, countries need to pay greater attention to the negotiating teams they assemble.  
They need to include economists and lawyers in these teams.  Economic issues with which 
negotiations deal and the legal framework underlying them is far too complex to be left to 
regular career bureaucrats.  Developed countries typically employ several lawyers and 
economists specialized in trade, investment, intellectual property and any other areas 
relevant to the negotiations.   
                                                 
15 For an elaboration of some of the points made in the following paragraphs, see Panagariya (2000). 
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step in this direction is to develop a clear idea of the final outcome the country seeks.  It 
should then ask if there is a feasible path to achieving the outcome.  If not, it must modify 
the outcome and repeat the exercise until the most desirable outcome that is also feasible is 
identified.  Such an exercise will lead to defining a realistic negotiating position. 
Third, developing countries need to build their native research capacity at least to the 
point that they can assess the studies done by outside researchers.  They should be able to 
minimally evaluate whether the claims made by the studies of costs and benefits to them 
from the proposed agreements are realistic.  Of course, for larger developing countries, it is 
important to have the capacity to do their own research.  They must also invest resources in 
disseminating this research to developed countries to make their case more forcefully and to 
gain its acceptance.   
Fourth, developing countries must learn to persist and negotiate very hard.  Persistence 
is crucial to achieve almost anything in the highly competitive environment that exists in 
these negotiations.  In this respect, there was marked difference between their performances 
at Doha and UR negotiations.  For instance, the African countries showed remarkable 
organization and persistence in extracting the Article I waiver for the ACP-EC Partnership 
(Cotonou) Agreement.  While the EU support was a crucial ingredient, this would not have 
come about without the African countries being vigilant and organized as well.  Likewise, 
by sheer persistence, India was able to put the Singapore issues on hold. 
Fifth, some thought may be given to cultivating an environment conducive to the 
growth of civil society groups.  Doha offered an excellent example of the power of these 
groups in making the plight of the poor and weak heard.  In the current international 
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developing country governments.  This course is not without risks, however.  The interests 
of specific civil society groups themselves need not always coincide with the country’s 
national interest.  Being relatively new to the game and short of financial resources, 
developing country groups may also be “captured” by developed country groups, which 
may or my not serve the national interest. 
Finally, where their interests coincide, developing countries must form alliances with 
other developing and developed countries.  For any issues that cut across North-South lines, 
it is very important that the larger developing countries speak with one voice.  Indeed, larger 
developing countries must try to develop joint positions on the issues of common interest.  
This factor becomes particularly important with the entry of China into WTO.  Together 
India and China account for more than two billion people and well over half of the poor in 
the world.  Therefore, if they were to speak with one voice on issues of concern to the poor, 
they are bound to have a major impact on the outcome.  Conversely, if they are divided, 
developed countries will most surely have their way.  This diagnosis will likely be tested at 
the Fifth WTOP Ministerial Conference.  If China decides to support negotiations on the 
Singapore issues at this Conference, India will have to give up all hope of carrying the day.  
On the other hand, if China and India jointly oppose negotiations on one or more of these 
issues, developed countries will find it difficult to ignore them. 
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